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Preface 
This paper deals with gradual retirement in Germany, the research field of the project e5 
within the Special Collaborative Centre 186. The project analyses transitions from 
employment into retirement, especially reactions to a new social policy regulation: the partial 
pension which was introduced by the Pension Reform of 1992. 
In Germany, the participation of eIder workers on the labour market has been declining since 
the beginning of the 1970s, while the population is ageing. Rising unemployment rates and 
relatively high benefit levels in the pension system have encouraged a "culture of early 
retirement" which has been supported so far by the relevant actors: state, employers and 
workers. Since the financing of pensions and unemployment benefits becomes more and more 
expensive for the economy, alternatives to an early and complete withdrawal from the labour 
force are being discussed. One of the most popular issues is the gradual transition from 
working life to retirement via partial work. 
In the first part the paper describes the labour market position of older workers in general, the 
current modes of labour exit and the institutional conditions set by the German social security 
system, which regulate the status passage from work to pension, with a special regard to the 
opportunities for gradual retirement. The second part concentrates on the micro level, the 
employees' attitutes towards work and retirement and the employers' demand for part-time 
work of older people. At the moment, company strategies to deal with an ageing workforce 
are mostly determined by externalisation strategies, but also examples of practical measures 
of a gradual exit from paid work in selected industries are given. 
Prof. Dr. A. Weymann 
Sprecher des Sfb 186 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
When and how to retire have become an important focus of economic and social policy in 
Germany. As in many other European countries, the reasons for this are population aging, 
labour market problems, particularly, a high rate ofunemployment, and the financing of social 
security, especially pensions. In Germany, however, in contrast to other countries, there is an 
important additional factor which makes the search for appropriate solutions to the challenges 
of structural change much more difficult. That additional factor is the process of German 
unification. 
In Germany, as in other countries, the issue of gradual retirement is of the utmost relevance to 
gerontologist and economist alike. But it also touches in a very practical way on the economic 
objectives of firm and household and of the state in the design and implementation of 
economic and social policy. Such objectives may frequently be in conflict or relate to the _ 
circumstances of different time horizons - the prevailing situation with its high 
unemployment, for example, as against the expected future shortage of qualified manpower 
due to demographic change. 
The design and organisation of gradual retirement can be undertaken at various levels: by 
individual firms, under collective agreements, or by the state with legislation. And gradual 
retirement schemes themselves can vary enormously, in terms, for example, of their time-
frame or of their effect on the income of employees. The latter will depend on alternatives for 
combining reduced work-time with earnings from employment and .with the benefit payments 
that emanate from a variety of different sources. Our purpose hereafter will be to describe the 
most important of such alternatives as exist in Germany and so provide a picture of the 
country' s practice of, or potential for, gradual retirement. 
Our paper will start with some data on the labour-market situation of older workers in 
Germany and on the legal frame-work more especially of statutory old-age insurance. We 
shall review the various options for labour-market exit and take a look at the new instruments 
introduced und er the Pension Reform Act of 1992. Weshall then turn to firm strategies 
providing examples of past and current models of gradual retirement and finally, in light of 
the new possibilites opened up by the 1992 Act, we shall attempt briefly to assess the 
prospects for gradual retirement in Germany in the future. 
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2 MACRO ISSUES AND POLICIES 
2.1 RECENT TRENDS 
2.1.1 Tbe Labour Market Position of Older Workers 
Older workers in Germany constitute a minority in the labour market. In 1993 people aged 55 
and over accounted for only 11 % of the totallabour force (Table 1). 
Table 1: The age structure the of labour force in Germany 1993 
Total Men Women 
Age in% 
<20 3.9 3,8 4.0 
20-24 10.2 9,6 11.1 
25-29 13.7 13,2 14.5 
30-34 13.8 13,8 13.6 
35-39 12.5 12.1 12.7 
40-44 12.3 11.9 12.7 
45-49 10.1 10.0 10.2 
50-54 12.6 12.9 12.1 
55-59 8.0 8.8 7.0 
60-64 2.2 2.9 1.3 
>64 0.8 0.8 0.8 
100 100 100 
Source: Mikrozensus (deviations from 100 % are due to roundings). 
Since the early 1970s, labour-force participation rates (LFPR) of men aged 55 and over 
dropped drastically (see Jacobs and Schmähl, 1989). This can clearly be seen from Figure 1: 
in West Germany the LFPR of men aged 63 was 67 % in 1970. After the introduction of a 
flexible retirement age in statutory pension insurance (in 1973) the LFPR went down within 2 
years by 20 % and within 10 years by 40 0/0. During recent years the LFPR of men aged 63 
has been fairly stable around 20 %. 
Figure 1: Labour force participation of different male cohorts: 
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Table 2 gives recent data on LFPR for Germany (West and Bast). Up to the age of 54 male 
LFPRs are relatively stable. Then a steady decline in higher ages takes place. Female LFPRs 
show the same picture, however on a lower level. A sharp drop of LFPRs occurs at 60, when 
female employees become eligible for an old-age pension. In 1993 only 40 % of men and 11 
% ofwomen were still working as employees at the age of60. 
Table 2: Labour-force participation rates of older men and women aged 55 and more in 
Germany 1993 
Age 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 > 64 
Men 83 76 72 67 61 47 39 31 20 16 4 
Wornen 55 46 42 36 32 15 12 10 8 6 2 
Source: Mikrozensus. 
About half of the women working between the age of 55 and 60 were on apart-time contract. 
For the 60 to 65 age group this figure is slightly higher even. For men part-time work is of 
little importance except that, of men still in the labour force after 65, 40 % work part-time. 
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Modes of Labour Exit 
LFPRs are influenced by a variety of factors. The modes of retirement available to those aged 
55 and over will very much depend on social-security provision, there being a range of 
possible pathways for transition from working life into retirement. In what follows, we first 
examine the options for exit from the labour market before eligibility for an old-age pension 
and, thereafter, we review the various options available within statutory pension insurance for 
hoth blue- and white-collar workers. Figure 2 provides a comprehensive overview of existing 
options. The principal modes of labour-market exit prior to drawing a pension are: 
pre-retirement arrangements (Vorruhestand); 
unemployment benefit up to the pension-insurance special early-retirerI1ent age, often 
topped up by additional payments by the employer. 
In West Germany, from 1984 until 1988, the Pre-Retirement Act was in force. It enabled 
workers aged 58 and over who withdrew from the labour market to receive bridge payments 
from their former employer until such time as they were able to draw a social-insurance 
pension. The law served to relieve labour-market pressures since older workers could quit the 
labour force without the stigma of unemployment. The Act required that such arrangements 
be the subject of collective agreements under which the employees concerned were eligible 
for pre-retirement benefits. 
Provided such benefits constituted at least 65 % of final gross earnings and provided the 
vacated job was refiIled, then the Federal Labour Office paid a subsidy of up to 35 % of the 
pre-retirement benefit as weIl as the employer's contribution to statutory health and pension 
insurance. About 70 % of empIoyees entitled to take up pre-retirement benefits under 
collective agreements actually did so. Many branches, however, the public sector being one 
exampIe, did not offer this alternative to their employees. 
From the beginning of 1989 until end 1991 only, this Act was replaced by the Part-time Work 
in Old Age Act which was a first attempt to establish a phased retirement system at the federal 
level. Employers who conc1uded apart-time work agreement with an employee aged at least 
58 could receive a subsidy from the Federal Labour Office provided certain conditions were 
met (see Schmähl and Gatter, 1994, p. 441): 
• the employee had to reduce his weekly ho urs by half, and work at least 18 hours a week 
on average; 
• the employer was obliged to supplement pay by at least 20 0/0; 
• the employer also had to make up the difference in pension insurance contributions 
between part-time pay and 90 % ofthe previous pay level; 
• the vacant job had to be filled with someone who was unemployed. 
This law was not financially attractive either for employers or employees and failed. 
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Figure 2: Options for transition into retirement provided for under social insurance legislation 
in Germany 
Age limit 
Pension because of 
vocational disability 
3 yrs compuls. contrib.llast 5 yrs 
Invalidity pension 
3 yrs compuls. contrib.llast 5 yrs 
"59" Regulation 
52 wks unemployrn.llast 1 1/2 yrs 
8 yrs compuls. contrib. lIast 10 yrs 
Pre-Retirement 
1990-92 in the 5 new states 
(the fonner GOR) 
Pre-Retirement 
for women 1984-88 by law 
since then by collecrive agreement 
Pre-Retirement 
for men 1984-88 by law 
since then by coHective agreement 
Full pension at 60 
for women 
10 yrs compul. contrib. from age 40 
Full pension at 60 
Oisabil lvocation disabil /invalidity 
35 yrs contriburion 
Flexible (fuH) 
pension at 63 
35 yrs contribution 
Full pension at 65 
Partial pension 
enritlement 10 a rerirement pension 
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main-~.4-"'" 
lyem-
ployed 
mai n- ... _ ......... I--li~ 
Iyem-
ployed 
591 601 
disabilitiy pension 
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Invalidity pension and 
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Old age 
pension 
Old age 
pension 
57yrs+4mo 
mainly 
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~ T 
unemploy- Old age pension for unemployed persons 
ment benefit 
55 _ ....... 
Special pre-retirement 
benefit 
Old age pension for unemployed persons 
....... I 
I 
I 
mainly 
employed 
Pre-retire- : Old age pension for women * 
ment benefit : insured for a longer period 
mainly employed 
mainly employed 
many years in employment 
many years in employment 
prior employment 
Employment 
Pre-retirement 
benefit 
:Old age pension 
: for persons insured 
:for a long period * 
Old age pension for women 
insured for a longer period 
Old age pension in the event 
of reduced fitness to work 
Old age pension 
for persons insured 
for a long period 
Normal 
old age 
pension 
individual: I .. I Full 
___________ J _____ ~----~----~----~ 
~<2I!l_bJ~~~9!.1_~~ _ _ I I pen-
employment and partial pension sion 
* if the respective requirements are met. If not, entitlement to pre-retirement only 3 years before the normal 
retirement age of 65 years 
yrs = years 
wks = weeks 
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F or many employers the Pre-Retirement Act was less attractive than the following alternative. 
F or older workers who become unemployed, statutory pension insurance provides an 
opportunity for early transition into retirement, whereby, after receipt of unemployment 
benefit, an old-age pension can be drawn at 60 years. A large number of employer/employee 
agreements made use of this pathway, many of them providing for additional financial 
compensation by the enterprise. The maximum period during which unemployment benefit 
can be received is now 32 months, and the older unemployed are now eligible for the latter 
without being obliged to look for a new job. Under certain circumstances employers have to 
reimburse part of the unemployment benefit. In other cases, if financial compensation is paid 
by the employer, the benefit is reduced.2 
After the socialist economy of former East Germany collapsed in 1989 the number of the 
regularly employed in East Germany dropped by 2.3 million between 1990 and 1993 (28 %). 
Nevertheless, the "official" number of unemployed in East Germany was only 1.2 million. 
The reduction in the number of the unemployed was in large measure due to the very wide 
coverage of pre-retirement measures (Schmähl, 1992b, with further references). Even before 
the introduction of the DM (July 1990) and unification (October 1990), the East German 
Govemment in February 1990 had brought into force an initial act which offered pre-
retirement benefits to men from the age of 60 and to women from the age of 55. The benefit 
was 70% of the last net earnings until the drawing of an old-age pension 'under the social 
insurance system of the German Democratic Republic, namely at 60 for women and 65 for 
men. 
After unification of the two German states, this was replaced by a special pre-retirement 
benefit, which was paid to women from the age of 55, to men initially from the age of 57 and 
later also from 55. Benefits were 65 % of individual average net earnings over the last three 
months, and were paid by the Federal Labour Office. In July 1993 the number of pre-
pensioners in East Germany peaked at 857 thousand. This was almost one third of official and 
"hidden" unemployment combined. These benefits will continue to be paid until 1997, but in 
the meantime many beneficiaries will reach 60, which will enable them to claim an old-age 
pension. 
In contrast to West German pre-retirement agreements, workers who were pensioned off in 
this way in East Germany sei dom chose this route of their own accord, but were mostly forced 
to retire early because the only other alternative was to become unemployed. Beside financial 
reasons, such as lower incomes resulting also in lower retirement benefits, people in East 
Germany expected to retire much later. In former socialist society, life at the workplace was a 
much more important facet of everyday existence than in market economies. Therefore some 
cohorts in East Germany have been profoundly affected by structural change after the collapse 
of the socialist economy and society. 
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2.1.2 Pensions and Social Security 
The German statutory pension scheme is a mandatory pay-as-you-go public pension insurance 
for all white- and blue-collar workers. Only permanent civil servants and certain groups of 
self-employed are not covered by this system. Craftsmen are insured on a compulsory basis, 
other self-employed on a voluntary basis. 80 % of revenue is from income-related social-
security contributions from eamings up to a contribution ceiling. Contributions are paid half 
by the employer and half by the employee. The other source of finance is federal grants. These 
are intended to compensate for pension-insurance expenditure aimed at interpersonal 
redistribution. Retirement benefits depend on the average relative eamings (i. e. individual 
gross eamings to average gross eamings in ever)' year of insurance) and the number of 
contribution years. Benefits are linked to the actual eamings level of all currently employed 
people and adjusted regularly to the net average eamings of all employees. Therefore pension 
policy is not primarly aimed at avoiding poverty, i. e. in principle no minimum pension exists, 
but to maintaining to a given extent the former standard of living (eamings replacement). 
Statutory pensions are by far the most important source of income in old age for most elderly 
German citizens. 
The German statutory pension scheme makes a clear distinction between disability and old-
age pensions. While for old-age pensions a certain age is required, this is not a precondition 
for disability pensions. Only 5 years of insurance and 3 years of contribution payments within 
the last 5 years are required. There are two types of disability pension. Pensions for vocational 
disability are awarded to people who are no longer able to carry out the job for which they are 
qualified. The disability pensioner is expected to work part-time in another job in addition to 
the pension in order to secure a full income. Invalidity pensions are awarded if the individual 
is no longer able to work at all. If a worker eligible for a disability pension is unable to find a 
part-time job within a certain time the disability pension is usually transformed into an 
invalidity pension. 
Age of retirement 
In Germany a range of retirement ages for claiming an old-age pension exists, offering certain 
flexibility in the transition from work to retirement. Table 3 gives a broad view of the 
different types of pension: vocational disability, invalidity and old-age pensions. In 1993, 
"'A {\/ {'. 11 _ t • t·...1 • 1...1' 1..'1' • 1'...1' • ...1 jU '/0 or au new male penSloners Clatmeu a vocatlonal ulsaOlllty or Invaliulty penSion anu 
70 % an old-age pension (women 80 %). As far as old-age pensions are concemed, more than 
1/3 of men and as many as 50 % of women claimed an early old-age pension at 60. One 
quarter of male old-age pensioners used a flexible old-age pension at 63, and about 40 % 
(men) and 50 % (women) took up an old-age pension at the official retirement age of 65. But 
of all new pensioners in 1993 take-up at the official age was only 1/4 for men and less than 
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40 % for women. Therefore the average retirement age even in statutory pension insurance is 
below 60 years. The average age of exit from the labour force, however, is even lower. 
It should be noted that up to now pensions c1aimed prior to the official retirement age are not 
reduced, as might be expected, by deductions because of the longer period of pension receipt. 
This is in principle a strong incentive to retire as early as possible. 
Table 3: Use of different retirement options in 1993 
Men Women 
absolute in% in% absoiute in% in % 
Old-age pensions 391.477 100 396.343 100 
for severely handicapped persons (60) 39.058 7 10 6.707 1 2 
for long term unemployed (60) 102.203 18 26 9.635 2 2 
for insured women (60) - - - 182.721 37 46 
for long-term insured (63) 95.098 17 24 12.050 2 3 
regular pension (65) 153.403 27 39 185.224 37 47 
Disability and invalidity pensions 170.800 30 100.741 20 
SUM (pensions of insured) 562.277 100 497.084 100 
~ 
Source: VDR (1994) and own calculations (deviations from 100 % are due to roundings). 
2.2 NEW PUBllC POllCIES 
2.2.1 Pension Reform of 1992 
Introduction of partial pensions 
The 1992 Pension Reform Act makes it possible for all old-age pensions in Germany not only 
to be taken up as full pensions but from now on also as partial pensions. By combining one 
third, one half or two thirds of full retirement benefits with eamings from a part-time job, a 
more flexible exit from the labour force for older workers has been created, thus providing a 
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model of late phased exit from the labour market into retirement. This was done because one 
objective of the reform act was to extend working life, to postpone retirement. Models which 
favour gradual exit before the earliest age of retirement in statutory pension insurance have 
been advocated by both trade unions and employers. 
F or partial pensioners before the age of 65 there exist ceilings for earnings beside the partial 
pension which depend on the individual's former earnings and the type of partial pension 
chosen3• The individual eamings ceiling is higher the lower the percentage of the fun pension 
claimed as a partial pension, and the ceiling is linked to increases in average het earnings of 
an employees. Table 4 shows ceilings for supplementary earnings for a so-called "standard 
pensioner" , a person who has 45 years of insurance and who eamed average eamings during 
this period. If we assurne that this pensioner also had an average monthly gross earning from 
full-time employment in his last working year of 4333 DM, his gross income from pension 
and employment can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4: Example for ca1culating gross income under the partial pension scheme for a 
standard pensioner (West Germany, 1995) 
Type of partial Supplementary % of last gross Pension Pension and % of last gross 
pension or fuH eamings limit eamings (DM) labour eamings eamings 
pension (DM) (2)+(4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
One third 3,220 74 690 3,910 90 
Half 2,415 54 1,035 3,450 80 
Two thirds 1,610 37 1,380 2,990 69 
Full pension 580 13 2,070 2,650 61 
Source: BfA-Mitteilungen, 1195, calculated according to Viebrok, 1993, 98 
Concerning gross income for pensions and eamings, we can see that partial retirement seems 
financially attractive if earnings from part-time employment are as high as the ceiling. For 
individuals and households net instead of gross income is in many respects decisive. Because 
income taxation for pensions and earnings is different, ca1culating the net income effect is 
rather complicated and depends on the mix of pensions and eamings. 
In Table 5 some ca1culations are made, assuming an income-tax rate for a married sole 
breadwinner, and the contribution rate for compulsory social security at the beginning of 
1995, which is 19.2 % (employee's part) of gross eamings. Income tax on pensions from the 
statutory pension system have to be paid only for apart of the pension, which is designed to 
be comparable to the "return on capital", so pensions in fact are almost tax free. Earnings 
below 580 DM (1995) are not burdened by social insurance contributions. Pensioners have to 
pay contributions to statutory health and long-term care insurance (6,65 %). 
Table 5: Sampie estimates of net income under the partial pension scheme for a standard 
pensioner (West Germany, 1995) 
Type of partial Supplernen- Pension Incorne taxes Contributions 
pension or full tary eamings (DM) (DM) to social 
pension limit (DM) security 
(DM)* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
One third 3,220.00 690.00 334.33 664.13 
Half 2,415.00 1,035.00 214.66 532.51 
Two thirds 1,610.00 1,380.00 99.16 400.89 
Full pension 580.00 2,070.00 0 137.66 
* In Germany there exist different contribution rates to health insurance funds. 
Source: BfA-Mitteilungen, 1/95, estirnated according to Viebrok, 1993, p. 98. 
Net incorne In % oflast 
(DM) net eamings 
(2)+(3)-(4)- (2992.32 
(5) DM) 
(6) (7) 
2,91l.54 97 
2,702.83 90 
2,489.95 83 
2,512.34 84 
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Regarding net income from pensions and eamings, we can see that a full pension with only 
marginal employment yields an income at least comparable to that which could be achieved 
with a partial pension. This might be one of the reasons why little use has been made of this 
new regulation so far. 
In 1992 and 1993 only 846 men and 1,067 women chose partial retirement as a phased exit 
from working life (Table 6). 
Table 6: Transitions into partial retirement 
1992 1993 
Partial old-age pensions Men Wornen Men Wornen 
for severely handicapped (60) 70 14 114 14 
for long term unernployed (60) 11 - 20 1 
for insured wornen (60) - 342 - 541 
for long-term insured (63) 248 78 378 71 
regular pension (65) 4 - 1 6 
SUM 333 434 513 633 
Source: VDR-Statistics. 
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Table 7: Use ofthe different types ofpartial pension 1993 
Men Women 
absolute in% absolute in % 
One third 140 27 193 30 
Half 211 41 268 42 
Two thirds 162 32 172 27 
SUM 513 100 633 100 
Source: VDR-Statistics and own calculations (deviations from 100 % are due to roundings). 
As can be seen from Table 6, most male partial pensioners use this option at the age of 63. 
Some rnen claimed a partial pension as disabled. Females make fairly full use of the pension 
for wornen at the age of60. About 40 % ofpensioners claim halfofthe full pension (Table 7). 
Why, then, was disappointingly little use made of this new form of flexible retirement, which 
had been discussed and advocated before its introduction? The main reason seems to be the 
unfavourable labour-market situation in Germany. There' was a broad political and social 
consensus to the effect that early exit of older workers was better than unemployment of 
young people. When reducing the workforce, total reduction is preferred. Moreover, 
expectations conceming early exit have developed over time, influenced also by institutional 
arrangements for early retirement. 
Secondly, partial pensions can only be claimed by women as of 60 and for most men as of 63 
(although for some at 60). After the age of 65 a partial pension ceases "to be attractive because 
as of that age there are no further eamings ceilings for people choosing full retirement. 
The regulations on individual eamings ceilings are very complicated and compliance has to be 
revised regularly. This implies high administrative costs for social insurance and for the 
employer. The employee runs the risk of being downgraded to a lower type of partial pension 
or, when he eams too much, of loosing his pension altogether. But since employees in general 
want to eam up to the eamings ceiling, previously negotiated wage increases can result in 
"excess" eamings. 
On the company side, in contrast to the situation in Sweden, there is a general lack of part-
time jobs especially for men. 
Age of Retirement 
From the year 2001 onwards the retirement ages for a pension without deductions ("reference 
retirement age") will gradually be increased until 2012 when 65 will become the reference 
retirement age for a "deduction free" old-age pension for both men and women. Earlier 
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retirement will then still be possible and the earliest retirement age will be 62. Only disabled 
people will still be able to stop working at 60. For every month a person retires earlier than 
the reference retirement age reductions in pension benefits of 0.3 % will occur. A reduction of 
3.6 % per year does not provide any strong incentive to work longer because it is still not 
actuarially fair (see Börsch-Supan, 1992, pp. 551). For each month a pension starts after the 
65th birthday, a supplement of 0.5 % is added to the pension. 
It is by no means certain that the introduction of deductions will have a positive impact on the 
use of gradual retirement4. On the one hand, it seems desirable for people who retire before 
the age of 65 (the official retirement age) to compensate reductions in pension benefits by 
eamings from part-time employment. On the other, the calculation of supplementary earnings 
limits will become even more complicated than it is nowadays because deductions also have 
to be taken into account. If invalidity and disability pensions are also deduction-free in the 
future, it will be important to avoid this type of pension becoming a loophole for many of 
those who want to retire early. 
3 MICRO ISSUES AND POLICIES 
3.1 RECENT TRENDS 
As mentioned already, the German legislator tried on several occasions to introduce gradual 
transition into retirement. But these attempts failed. Whether there is an opportunity in 
practice to establish gradual retirement in Germany will depend on decisions at the micro 
level of the economy, influenced by preferences of individuals and by the objectives of 
enterprise. The following remarks are intended to provide some information about the 
decision-making of employers and employees and the practical problems of implementing 
gradual retirement and part-time work of older workers. 
3.1.1 Attitudes Towards Work and Retirement 
For most employees eamings from employment are their main source of income and it is 
gainful employment also that stabilises individual identity. But for many employees also, 
depending on working conditions, health status etc., employment is a burden. Therefore 
decisions of older employees conceming transition to retirement are mainly influenced by its 
effect on their income, social relations, health, type of work and situation at the workplace. 
Workers, for example, facing high health hazards are likely to try to reduce the work load 
even by accepting high losses of income. Under such circumstances, a model of gradual 
retirement, which delays the transition to retirement would hardly be acceptable, but phased 
retirement at a lower age can help to decrease the pressures of work and maintain a relatively 
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high level of income. When gainful employment implies a high level of individual 
satisfaction, delaying exit from work through gradual retirement meets the income aim while 
preserving the employee's work·dependant social status. These examples show that gradual 
retirement corresponds to different employee preferences and that many employees are in 
principle likely to be interested in retiring step by step. 
Subjective data of the German Socio-economic Panel5 show that more than one third of all 
men aged 50 years and over would accept a part-time job, were the 10ss of income to be 
substituted by a partial pension. Nearly 40 % of all women in full employment could also 
imagine using the partial pension option (see DIW, 1988, p. 54). A question concerning the 
preferred begilliling and ending of phased retirement revealed a significant preference for an 
early transition into retirement. Male respondents on average would like to start gradual 
retirement at 57lh. and to end it at about 60lh.. The actual age they expected to retire was on 
average about 61lh. years. Women preferred beginning and ending phased retirement some 
months earlier than men, their expected retirement age being 60 (Table 8). This c1early 
demonstrates that expectations are strongly influenced by existing institutional arrangements. 
The strong preference for leaving the workforce step-by-step as early as possible is one 
explanation for the low interest in the partial-pension option under the 1992 Pension Reform 
Act, which permits gradual retirement only when the employee is entitled to an old-age 
pension. Moreover that partial pension is not as financially attractive as the hypothetical 
partial-pension scheme on which the questions in the Socio-economic Panel were based. A 
further result from the panel survey is that blue-collar workers especially would like to retire 
as early as possible. 
Table 8: Supposed beginning and ending ofpartial pensions on average and expected effective 
average age for full retirement according to the Socio-economic Panel 
Group Gender Occupation 
Men Wornen Blue collar White collar Public Self 
workers workers servants ernployed 
Average Age 
Expected effective age for 61,4 60,0 60,6 61,3 61,9 60,8 
fuH retirernent 
Start of partial pension 57,5 56,4 57,2 57,3 57,6 57,0 
End of partial pension 60,7 59,8 60,2 60,8 60,4 59,6 
Source: DIW, 1988, p. 57. 
Empirical research on work in old ag~ indicates a strong preference for a shorter working 
period within the life cyc1e (see Landenberger, 1983, pp. 23). A study of the attitudes of 
employees aged 49-60 to reducing work time indicated that 65.5 % would prefer early 
retirement compared to fewer weekly work hours or longer vacations (see Engfer et al., 1983, 
p. 101 or Viebrok, 1993, p. 81). Younger employees voted mostly for longer holidays and 
17 
middle-aged people would like to work fewer hours per week. The Institut für Arbeitsmarkt-
und Berufsforschung (lAB) asked employees aged 55 or more about their attitudes to 
transition to retirement: 60 % favoured early exit. Bad health and lack of job satisfaction were 
frequently cited as reasons for early retirement (see Blaschke et al., 1986, p. 277). A survey by 
the Emnid research institute confirms that health status is an important reason for the 
retirement decision: 36 % of retired people said that they had left their job because of bad 
health (see Emnid, 1993, p. 41). 
But in evaluating such findings it is necessary to take into account that the motives mentioned 
may not have been the real reasons for the decision, that the people interviewed were not 
confronted with real and existing models of transition to retirement, and that they were mostly 
unaware of the financial impact of gradual retirement. Extending working life, especially 
when an old-age pension is available, depends usually on economic incentives. Emnid (1993) 
asked people still working at pension age about their motives for doing so: 80 % mentioned 
that one reason was "lack of money". 
Companies regard employee retirement as an important facet of personnel management. Every 
retirement, even gradual retirement, means arelease of personnel and a vacating of a work 
place (see Stitzel, 1985, p 120; Viebrok, 1993, pp. 82). For the employers retirement can fulfil 
three major aims of personnel management (see Rosenow and Naschold, 1994, pp. 211): 
1. Reducing personnei; 
2. Exchanging personnei, i. e. replacing older employees by younger ones; 
3. Changing personnel structure, i. e. replacing older employees by employees with higher 
education and qualification. Here (as in 2.) higher productivity and/or lower labour costs 
are expected. 
Gradual retirement can, however, serve other personnel-management purposes (see Deters et 
al., 1989, pp. 36), for example: 
4. Retaining personnel; 
5. Recruiting personnel. 
The objective of retaining personnel or rather maintaining human capital was the main reason 
for introducing models of gradual retirement in three out of the five companies investigated 
by Deters et al. (1989, p. 219). 
Complete retirement or total redüction i5, however, not ahvays the ideal ansv/er to perSOl' ... Ilel-
structure adjustment problems. In many cases gradual retirement would be the better solution. 
The fact that many of the models of gradual retirement currently applied were initiated by 
enterprises (Deters, Staehle and Stirn, 1987, p. 35) shows that employers as well are aware of 
the organising potential of different forms of transition to retirement. Whether gradual 
retirement can be made to meet personnel-management needs depends on how authoritative 
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companies are in the design and application of phased retirement (Deters, Staehle and Stirn, 
1987, S. 36). 
Using gradual retirement for personnel objectives further depends on the availability of 
strategies for complete extemalisation of older employees. In recent years companies have 
preferred to use early retirement, especially under the Pre-Retirement Act and the so-called 
"59-Regulation", to reduce the number of the employed and to restructure staff. A survey by 
Rosenow and Naschold shows that early retirement is used not only to reduce staff, since it is 
used in prospering as weIl as in declining branches, and in the service sector as weIl as in 
industry (Rosenow and Naschold, 1994, pp. 203). A study of retirement in the insurance 
industry in Germany indicates that early retirement is also pr~ferred in branches with low 
pressure to reduce the workforce and that early retirement can help to adjust the age structure 
and qualification of staff (Schmähl and Gatter, 1994). 
3.1.2 Work Performance 
It is thanks to Thomae and Lehr (1973) that the so-called "deficit-model of growing old",' 
which posits a general decline of physical and psychological performance as Iife progresses, 
no longer secures any serious support in the scientific literature (see also Dohse et al., 1982, 
pp. 14). It is only common sense to evaluate an individual's work performance in the context 
of the operation to be performed and of working place conditions (Deters et al. , 1989, 
pp. 235). 
Nevertheless, personneI-management theory presupposes that individual physical 
performance declines and experience increases with age (see Drumm, 1992, p. 122). Even 
though the interdependence of age and physical performance seems obvious, empirical 
research cannot conclusively prove decreasing work performance in oider workers. Thomae 
and Lehr (1973) surveyed studies on the productivity of oider workers. These studies carried 
out in different enterprises yielded different results: some indicated no differences between 
older and younger workers, several higher productivity for younger ones and others -
surprisingly - a higher performance for older workers. The findings of Thomae and Lehr 
cannot claim validity for modem work~laces where new skills are required, since the studies 
are based on operations in traditional occupations. Oider employees are said to suffer from 
disadvantages in leaming new skills and operating new technologies (see Deters et al., 1989, 
pp. 235; Hentze, 1994, p. 152). 
Another problem conceming work performance are higher wages of oider workers because of 
increasing age-eamings-profiles. Göbel's study (1983), based on data on the German statutory 
pension scheme for bIue-collar workers, indicates a positive correlation between wages and 
age. Similar results are given by Bellmann and Buttler (1989) using data of the Federal 
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Labour Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit). Seniority-based wage systems (see KnolI, 1994) can 
be a barrier to postponing retirement (see Bellmann, 1989). 
A further obstacle to the employment of older people is the investment in human capital of 
older employees. There exist several objections to training older workers: firstly, older 
employees have less accumulated human capital since they have fewer formal qualifications 
than younger ones (see Ho ffm ann , 1993, p. 323). Therefore they have a smaller basis for 
occupational training activities. Secondly, older employees are said to be lacking in the ability 
to leam where new technologies are concerned (see Hentze, 1994), namely, they have a 
negative self-image regarding their own ability to learn and perform. Thirdly, the shorter 
period for amortising investment in human capital hinders vocational training of older 
employees from the point ofview ofboth employer and employee. Fourthly, the higher wages 
of older workers Inean higher opportunity costs for vocational training. Finally, older workers 
with strong preferences for early retirement are possibly not willing to "go to school". 
3.1.3 Company Pension Regulations 
In Germany the freedom to enter into contracts is guaranteed, and therefore gradual retirement 
could theoretically be introduced under agreements between employers and employees. In 
reality, however, there are only a few models of phased retirement established under the 
initiative of those involved. Gradual retirement has been given some emphasis only in certain 
collective bargaining agreements, such as in the cigarette industry, in chemieals, and in parts 
of the plastics and metal industries. Some firms have also individually introduced gradual 
retirement schemes. 
Since 1978 older workers in the cigarette industry have been either entitled to reduce their 
work time to 20 hours weekly without any loss of income or to leave~ the workforce 
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completely in teturn for 75 % of the their last earnings (see Schwahn, 1988, pp. 88; Jacobs, 
1988, p. 4). Under this agreement it was possible for women and the severely disabled to 
reduce employment at the age of 58 and men at 61. It was up to the employee to claim these 
options. Employers were able to reject an application for gradual retirement, but had to offer 
full retirement to the employees instead. The use of both options rose from about 70 % in 
1979 to more than 90 % in the second half of the eighties. But the choice between the 
alternatives had changed completely: in 1979, 70.8 % decided to work part-time; in 1982, 
only 43.8 % opted for partial retirement. The lowest use made of the part-time option vvas in 
1986, when only 18.1 % opted for partial retirement. 
In 1985 a collective agreement on part-time work in old age was signed for the chemical 
industry (see Prognos, 1986, pp. 162; Kohli et al. , 1989, pp. 207). Employees at 58 were 
entitled to choose between two alternatives: they could retire fully and receive a pre-
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retirement benefit or they could work part-time and receive 70 % income replacement. It was 
up to the employee to initiate the reduction in work hours and up to the employer to offer one 
of the two options available. Until 1986, 8 % of men eligible for early retirement and 13 % of 
women applied for part-time work. At that time employers had consented to 22 % of the 
applications by men and 33 % of those by women. When part-time work was rejected 
employers usually offered full early retirement. Companies stated that they often had to reject 
applications for part-time work because they had problems in organising the flow of work and 
in splitting workplaces. In evaluating the alternatives to fuH and partial early retirement 
enterprises voted clearly for complete exit from the labour force. Thus far, in the opinion of 
employers, full retirement is a better way of reducing personne1 and adjusting staff structures. 
In addition, certain companies also established gadual retirement agreements. Table 9 gives an 
overview over the best-known models operating during the eighties. 
Table 9: Company models of gradual retirement in Germany 
Company Start and duration Working hours Income Further conditions 
of grad. retirement 
Daimler Benz AG from 60 half-time full income for 6 10 years work in 3 
for the last three months, then shifts 
years of gradual reducing to 
employment 80 % of the last 
gross income 
Deutsche BP from 55 reductiori of 2 hours full income 
during the last year daily during the first 
of employment 6 months, then 
reduction of 4 hours 
IBM from 56 half-time 50 % ofthe last 
gross income plus 
occupational 
pension 
Pieroth Weingut- (1) from 60 to 63 (1) 35 hours weekly (1) income for 37,5 10 yearstenure 
Kellerei GmbH hours weekly 
(2) from 63 to 65 (2) 30 hours weekly (2) income for 35 
hours weekly 
Siemens AG from 56 half-time 75 % ofthe last 20 years tenure 
to 63 gross income 
at most 4 years 
Sources: Schüle, 1987; Schusser, 1988; Stitzel, 1985 and Viebrok, 1993. 
3.1.4 Age Discrimination 
In social sciences the comparison of incomes of different groups of employees is often used as 
an indicator of discrimination against certain categories of staff. Seniority wages are 
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empirically weIl documented, therefore income discrimination against older employees is not 
significant. The higher wages of older workers, however, bear risks, because wages above real 
or expected work productivity are an important incentive for companies to Iay off older 
workers. The decreasing Iabour force participation of older workers and the early retirement 
strategies of enterprises seem to confirm this hypothesis. Some studies on early retirement 
regard older workers as victims of the extemalisation strategies of companies. Other research -
especially on the effects of the Pre-Retirement Act - indicates that older employees have 
themselves a strong preference for early retirement and that they attempt to speed up their 
own withdrawal from the workforce (see Kohli, 1993, pp. 191). 
Early retirement is as a rule carried out with the agreement of oider empIoyees, because there 
is strong protection of older workers against dismissals, so they cannot easily be laid off. But 
"social pressure" especially in times of high unemployment of younger people can be an 
important factor affecting an older worker's decision to retire. Companies control the labour-
force participation of older workers by using different retirement incentives. The range of 
methods runs from indirect measures like bad conditions at the workplace without any offer of 
retirement options to direct measures which offer concrete plans for retirement (see Rosenow 
and Naschold, 1994, pp. 220 or Naschold et al., 1994, pp. 130). 
Older employees face serious problems when they are laid off and do not want to enter full 
retirement, because, for example, their pension would be too Iow. Because of existing 
protection against dismissals the risk of getting laid off is not extremely high for older 
workers. The problem of unemployment of older people is its long duration: two thirds of 
about 474,000 long-term unemployed are 45 or older (see Bogai et al., 1994, p. 74). A survey 
of Iong-term unemployed over 45 showed that 64 % had a stable employment biography 
before becoming unemployed (see Bogai et al., 1994, p. 74). Bogai et al. supposed that age 
itself makes it difficult to find a new job and proved this hypothesis empiricaIly. This 
underlines the hypothesis that with the spread of early retirement not only does its (average) 
age decrease, but also the age at which a worker is looked upon as becoming "oId" resulting 
in Iower hiring probabilities. Another survey carried out with data from the employment 
administration confirmed the link between old age and the duration of unemployment and 
stressed the relevance of health status to reemployment (see Cramer and Karr, 1992). Also 
according to Bogai et al. (1994), health problems play"an important role: two thirds of the 
long-term unemployed stated that they are suffering from bad health and more than 30 % had 
official status as disabled persons. 
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3.2 NEW COMPANY POLICIES 
3.2.1 Personnel Poliey 
The need for better integration of older people into the workforce is increasingly admitted in 
publications on personnel management and by employers in their statements. Demographic 
development is influencing not only the financing of social security but also the age structure 
of company staff. The provision of human resources of the right quality and in the quantity 
desired is a key task of personnel management (see Nienhüser, 1989, p. 13). However, 
demographic changes will, it seems, make fulfilment of this task difficult in the future. 
Although there is enormous pressure to produce new personnel policies for the future, there is 
as yet no evidence of significant change in companies' behaviour. 
3.2.2 Flexible Work and Pay Poliey 
Although there are flexible work arrangements in some companies or branches (in the metal 
and chemical industries in West Germany), which make possible reduction of weekly work 
hours and longer vacation for older workers also (see Weidinger and Kutscher, 1992), the 
main difference between such arrangements and former models of part~time work in old age is 
that the employers no longer substitute income loss due to reduction of work hours. It is up to 
the employee to save work hours during prior periods on a "time account" basis so as to 
enable hirn to reduce work activity in the period leading up to full retirement. 
3.2.3 Partial Pension 
Implementing partial pensions according to the 1992' Pension Reform Act raises several 
problems. The result is, as mentioned al re ady , that the partial pension is hardly used as an 
opportunity for gradual retirement. Older employers still have a preference for early 
retirement, the expected shortage, for demographic reasons, of Y0l.lnger workers has as yet not 
occurred and many firms still want to cut down their staff so as to reduce labour costs. 
Further problems re!ate to regulation of the partial pension itself. The calculation of work 
hours acC"ording to an eamings ceiling is a complicated exercise which requires flexible 
organisation of the workforce by companies. Every change in the hourly wage, for example 
through collective bargaining, demands fresh calculation of working hours and perhaps a 
changed work schedule. This involves high transaction costs for employers. 
The introduction of partial pensions was accompanied by the abolishing of mandatory 
retirement,6 with the result, in particular, that provisions in collective agreements which 
stipulate that work contracts automatically end at 65 are no longer valid. This caused an 
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unintended effect: some employees abused the regulation by negotiating a golden hand shake 
from their employer in exchange for withdrawing from the labour force. These incidents 
stirred up a discussion about mandatory retirement which ended with the restitution of its 
former legal status (see Schmähl and Gatter, 1994). 
Occupational pension schemes can be an obstac1e to gradual retirement when occupational 
pensions are paid only to workers who retire completely. Adapting entitlement to 
occupational pensions to payments from the statutory pension scheme will have a positive 
impact on the use of gradual retirement. Moreover, if the occupational pension is based on the 
last gross earnings, then workers choosing gradual retirement will be able to reduce their 
occupational pension claims. 
3.2.4 Training 
Development of the qualification structure of the workforce demands increased training 
efforts in most occupations. In workplaces in almost all sectors of the economy, the call for 
lower qualifications is fading while the number of higher qualified employees is increasing 
constantly. This trend, it is thought, will continue at least for the next decade (see Buttler and 
Tessaring, 1993). 
Nevertheless, older employees se1dom take part in further vocational training even in branches 
which provide many training opportunities. A study of the Gennan insurance industry (see 
Schmähl and Gatter, 1994) confirms the prejudices against the learning abilities of older 
workers and the rejection of further training by older employees themselves. Thus the 
participation of older employees in extended training dec1ines dramatically at the age of 50. 
The example of the insurance industry shows that there is a strong need for new personne1 
policies in companies in order to prepare for the changing age structure of the labour force. 
Reliable data on age structure of extended vocational training on a broader base are only 
available for public measures financed by the Federal Labour Office. The labour 
administration carries out further training when people are faced with serious problems on the 
labour market. On account of the weak labour-market position of older workers we can 
assurne that they are in principle an important target group for public-financed vocational 
training. Nevertheless, not even 10 % of all participants of such training measures are 44 and 
older (see Buttler, 1994, p. 35). If we make the reasonable assumption that vocational training 
of older workers is widely neglected in the private sector, then it can be said that an essential 
condition for changing the employment behaviour of older workers is lacking. Only by 
providing qualification facilities for older workers will the use of delayed models of gradual 
retirement like the partial pension under the 1992 Pension Reform Act become more common. 
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4 POTENTIAL FOR GRADUAL RETIREMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Our analysis of the transition to retirement in Germany has shown that there is still a strong 
tendency to early as well as full retirement. This is in line with the current preference of many 
employees and in accord with the strategy of many firms to solve their firm-specific problems 
by extemalising older workers and rejuvenating staff. Now, however, some firms are 
beginning to complain that reduction and rejuvenating of staffhas gone too far. 
Recently, there has been a public debate in Germany about the fact that the early-exit 
strategies of firms are shifting costs to social insurance, especially to the pension system, and 
are increasing contribution rates and thereby labour costs, at a time when finns are precisely 
demanding a reduction in those labour costs. Areform of the Act on Employment Promotion 
is announced for the near future and will contain measures to reduce early exit. 
Regarding the rapid aging of the German population, a delay in exit from the labour force and 
longer periods of contribution payments to social security will be necessary for financing 
social insurance, especially statutory pension insurance. Gradual retirement could be a way of 
achieving this aim especially if, in the light of future labour-market trends, it is combined with 
other social policy measures as weIl. Part-time work is likely to increase the productivity of 
work per hour. This holds true for older employees, and would meet the interest of employers 
in reducing unit labour costs. 
In 1995 labour unions proposed a gradual reduction of work time for older workers prior to 
being able to claim an old-age pension. There should be a right to a part-time job for oider 
workers and eamings should be combined with benefits from unemployment insurance. 
However, employers may be expected strongly to contest any rule whereby employees and 
not employers decide upon working time arrangements. From the point of view of firms, 
controllability and reversibility seem to be of great importance (see Staehle 1989). 
There is also an increasing debate about changing retirement ages for civil servants aimed at 
reducing early exit and introducing gradual retirement options, the purpose of both these 
measures being to lengthen working life and reduce (tax-financed) pension costs for 
households. 
It is obvious from past experience that institutional mIes matter a lot and influence behaviour 
and expectations. Acceptance of changes in institutional mIes can be assumed to be quicker if 
the mIes are accompanied by favourable environmental conditions as weIl as attractive 
incentives. Now however, mIes are changed although environmental (e. g. labour-market) 
conditions remain unfavourable: in the future there will be less incentive to retire earlier. 
How firms and employees react within the new legal framework will be influenced above all 
by labour-market conditions. Labour-market projections (e. g. Prognos, 1995; Enquete-
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Kommission, 1994) point to a radical change on the labour market (mostly influenced by 
demographie change) after 2010. So, among other things, firms must decide whether they 
want to employ older workers with high qualifications longer (beyond even the reference 
retirement age ofthe statutory pension system) and on a part-time basis (women and men), or 
try to make up for the lack of manpower by using immigrants. Preparing for the future, then, 
means increased training for workers commencing in mid work -life at the very latest, as a 
necessary prerequisite for extending the employment of older workers in a world where the 
demand for highly qualified manpower is on the increase. 
Given this situation, given also the growing interest among employees in flexible work-time 
arrangements, gradual retirement options could weIl give fi.rms a competitive edge in the 
future struggle for a share in the limited pool of employees of qualification and experience. 
With life expectancy set to increase further, gradual retirement could give those able and 
willing to work longer an opportunity to do so, and those workers with health impairments a 
reprieve from untimely full retirement in the form of part-time employment. 
To date, the German experience of gradual retirement has not been particularly promising. 
The indications are, however, that the situation is about to change. 
1 For their assistance in preparing this overview we are grateful to Jutta Gatter and Holger Viebrok, who are • 
of course - not responsible for any remaining errors. Rainer George and Christiane Oswald wish to thank the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for financial support. 
2 This pathway became known as the "59-Regulation" because workers in the past could draw unemployment 
benefits at the age of 59. Meanwhile this bridge to pension starts at 57 years and 4 months, taking into 
account 32 months of unemployment benefits before 60. 
3 For a detailed overview conceming the regulations eamings ceilings see Reimann (1991) and Schmähl 
(1992a, pp. 94). 
4 For possible future effects of these changes see Schmähl (1992a). 
5 The German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) is a longitudinal survey of a representative sampie of about 
5,000 households, which started in 1984. 
6 AccOiding to § 41 Abs. 4 S. 3 Sozialgesetzbüch VI. 
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